I.          SEADS/NORAD claim no knowledge of Cuban hostile intent on Feb. 24, 1996 until the first aircraft was shot down

           

 

    A.    No knowledge prior to Major Jeffrey Houlihan’s [i] (Major Houlihan) “911” call

           

            SEADS’ responses to subcommittee’s questions that repeat this issue:

 

Questions: 1,    2,         3,         6,         8,         9,         13,       14,       16,       20,

22        26,       34

 

BTTR’s comments

 

            Attachment 1 documents that the US government had prior knowledge of Castro’s intention to shoot down the BTTR aircraft.

 

    B.     No knowledge after Major Jeffrey Houlihan’s “911” call

 

            Background

 

According to sworn testimony[ii] by Major Houlihan, at 3:16 PM he called the Senior Director Technician at the Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida (Southeast Air Defense) and told them that he saw a high speed primary only aircraft coming out of the Cuban ADIZ and that he suspected it was a Cuban MiG and that it was going directly over the BTTR.  Major Houlihan has referred to this call as a “911 call”:

 

Houlihan:          “Do you see the BTTR aircraft?

 

Tyndall:            “Yes.”

 

Houlihan:          “Do you know what’s going on with them today?”

 

Tyndall:            “Yes, we’ve been briefed.”

 

Houlihan:          “Do you see that primary aircraft, 500 knot primary?”

 

Tyndall:            “Yes, we see it.”

 

Houlihan:          “Well it looks like a MIG-23 to me heading directly towards the United States.  I think that’s important.”

 

Tyndall:            “Yes, we’ve been briefed…Yes, we’re handling it, don’t worry.”

 

Reference:        Major Houlihan’s testimony, page 468, attachment 12.

 

After much prodding by Congressman Dan Burton and others during the hearing to get the name of the person at Tyndall Air Force Base who received Major Houlihan’s “911” call, one of the US government witnesses, Ms. Maria Fernández, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of Defense, indicated that she had just been informed that on February 24, 1996 the senior Southeast District watch officer was Colonel Frank Willy, US Air Force, who had since retired (page 22 of the hearing).

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

(Emphasis added)

 

RQ 12:  “A review of the Customs telephone transcript indicates the call was taken by the Senior Director Technician, who routinely handles assignment of target symbology, FAA coordination, or other telephone coordination; coordination with Customs is a routine function.  We do not know which SD Technician took the call.  Transcript review indicates the conversation was a routine coordination of radar track activity to ensure SEADS was tracking the specific target.  ”

 

RQ 21:  “From a SEAD’s perspective, the phone call (Major Houlihan’s) was no more than normal communication between SEADS and any other organization in the process of monitoring radar tracks.”

 

RQ 26:  “At the time Mr. Houlihan called, the air picture was assessed by SEADS to be very similar to other times when the Cuban MiGs have intercepted the BTTR aircraft…” (BTTR’s note: please refer to Issue VIII.).  SEADS did not perceive a “911” situation…”

 

SEADS’ responses to subcommittee’s questions that repeat this issue:

 

1,         5,         16,       18,      

 

BTTR’s questions:

 

What was the nature of the briefing given to this “unknown” SD technician?

 

What would SEADS consider an “abnormal/nonroutine” call?

II.         NORAD/SEADS claim that there was no “elaborate plan” known to them for tracking the BTTR flight of Feb. 24, 1966. (SEADS’ response to question 17)

           

Background

 

Please refer to the ICAO Report[iii], pages 50-51, attachment 2, for a description of the radars and monitors that the US had on alert on February 24, 1996 to monitor BTTR’s flight, including the request by the manager of FSDO in Miami that the B94 aerostat radar balloon at Cudjoe Key, Florida to be “put up”.

 

Major Houlihan’s facility had also received a request from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) about a week before the flight of Feb 24, 1996 to maintain a record of that flight and forward it to the FAA after the flight was completed.  Major Houlihan indicated he had been briefed that BTTR intended to make a political statement by flying down towards Cuba.  Never before had his facility created a log of a BTTR flight.

 

Reference:  Major Houlihan’s Testimony, Pages 361-362 and 449-451, attachment 12.

 

BTTR’s Questions

 

As of February 24, 1996 BTTR had conducted more than 1,800 search and rescue flights in the same area.  Were the same “not elaborate” plans of February 24, 1996 followed on these occasions?

 

Was the FAA’s request to Customs to record “the scope data on the BTTR aircraft on February 24, 1996 based upon the need to gather supporting information on BTTR violations” typical? 

 

SEADS indicated that in response to this expressed interest by the FAA, SEADS  also took steps to record their data.  Question: Who at SEADS made this decision?

III.       NORAD/SEADS claim that they have never provided BTTR warning of MiGs airborne north of Cuba

 

SEADS’ responses to subcommittee’s questions that repeat this issue:

           

2,         14       

 

Please refer to Issue VIII.  BTTR pilots recall two specific occasions.

IV.       SEADS claims that Cuba had given BTTR a legitimate “warning” on Feb 24, 1996

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

 

RQ 6:    “If the lead BTTR aircraft had heeded the warning call from Havana, which he acknowledged, the shoot down would not have occurred.”

 

BTTR’s Comments

 

SEADS’ use of the word “warning” legitimizes what was categorized by Mr. Michael Ranneberger, in referring to other similar threats by Cuba, as: “I would use threat, not warning.  Warning implies there is a legitimacy.” (page 33 of the hearing). 

 

This was a threat by a terrorist state that had no legal basis.  Cuba had repeated this threat on most of BTTR search and rescue missions, which helped in saving the lives of over four thousand refugees escaping Cuba and seeking freedom in the US.

V.        SEADS claims that standard operating procedures (SOP) for the scrambling of US interceptors were followed on Feb 24, 1996 at the time of the shootdown

 

Background

 

In sworn testimony, Major Houlihan described a line that runs close to Cuba’s 12 mile territorial limit as delimiting “an area which, should any targets appear in that position heading towards the United States, they, the United States Military has told me specifically that anything that appears in that area heading towards the US, they’re going to launch on immediately without waiting the normal identification process.  It’s, if I might use a colloquialism, in my own facility, we refer to it as the Southeast Air Defense’s Cone of Paranoia”.  (This line will be referred to hereafter as the “trigger line” SOP.)

 

He added that the Southeast Air defense has made it very clear to him in briefings at the Southeast Air Defense, that anything that pops up inside that area, they will launch their interceptor aircraft on immediately. 

 

Major Houlihan stated that on February 24, 1996 the MiGs were in that area and that’s why he made the “911” call (Issue I.B).

 

Reference:  Major Houlihan’s testimony, pages 482-484, attachment 12.

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

(Emphasis added)

 

RQ 7:    “Cuban MiGs flying north of Cuba conducting routine operations do not necessarily trigger scramble of US fighter aircraft.  A specific set of criteria and procedures are in place to execute the air sovereignty mission should this criteria be met.”

 

RQ 10:    “Our policy for protecting US airspace remains unchanged.  Any unknown/nonflight plan aircraft entering the ADIZ will be intercepted, identified, and escorted or monitored as appropriate.

 

RQ 12:    “SEADS knew that BTTR was flying; further, they were actively responding in accordance with established procedures to the MiG activity”.

 

RQ 20:    “The MiGs did fly out of their 12 mile territorial limit, but not outside their internationally recognized ADIZ (which extends north to the 24th parallel) and fly toward the BTTR aircraft.”

 

RQ 27.    “NORAD/SEADS followed standard procedures on February 24th.  As discussed, NORAD does not routinely scramble aircraft in response to MiGs operating north of Cuba.  These procedures were not changed on February 24th for any reasons”.

 

RQ 33:    “…at no time based upon NORAD scramble criteria did the position of the Cuban MiGs dictate a scramble.”

 

SEADS’ responses to subcommittee’s questions that repeat this issue:

 

3          8,         11,                   18,       26

 

BTTR’s comments and questions

 

SEADS did not directly challenge the existence of a “trigger line” within the air defense SOP described in Mr. Houlihan’s testimony, but refers to the crossing of the 24th parallel (the entering into the US ADIZ) as the criteria for scrambling US interceptors. 

 

The 24th parallel is only about 4 minutes flight time for a MiG to the US shore.  Airborne reaction time for a US interceptor not on battlestations alert is about 5-8 minutes.  Therefore, if the 24th parallel is the criteria for scrambling US interceptors, a MiG would arrive in the US before US interceptors become airborne.

 

On Feb 24, 1996, about 3 hours before the shootdown and before the departure of the BTTR flight, US interceptors from Homestead Air Force Base scrambled responding to the departure of MiGs from Cuba.  (Issue VI).

 

Questions:

 

Is Major Houlihan’s testimony about the “trigger line” erroneous?

 

Why were two different criteria used for scrambling US interceptors on Feb 24, 1996, before and during the BTTR flight?

VI.       SEADS claims that it followed standard operating procedures (SOP) for scrambling US interceptors on Feb 24, 1996.  (BTTR’s note: On Feb 24, 1996, before the departure of the BTTR flight, SOP were followed.  They were not followed when BTTR aircraft were in “harm’s way.”)

 

Plate:  C207 Special Intrest 24 Feb 96 (attachment 3)

 

Significance:

 

This plate depicts the standard operating procedures (SOP) of US air defenses in action: a scrambling of US fighter planes from Homestead Air Force Base.  This action took place three hours prior to the BTTR shootdown of Feb 24, 1996.  It shows an immediate response to the presence of Cuban MiGs in the same area of the air ambush that murdered US citizens.  Upon BTTR’s arrival to the area, just three hours later, the SOP was placed on hold, allowing Castro to act freely against BTTR.

 

Items of interest:

 

1.                  The SOP was in effect and tested the day of the shootdown.  No crossing of the 24th Parallel by Cuban MiGs was necessary to trigger a US response.

2.                  US Air Force presence was enough deterrent; no close encounter was needed.  The Cuban MiGs and the US interceptors remained far apart in miles (approx. 80 nm); however, very close in flight time: four to eight minutes apart, depending on the course taken.

3.                  Radar ground controllers in Cuba observed the US response and gave instructions accordingly.  The MiGs left.

4.                  Retreat of MiGs upon US response is evident.  MiGs last seen at

5.                  12:41 PM.  US interceptors return to base at 1:06 PM.

6.                  Closest distance of MiGs to Key West radar B-94 at Cudjoe Key: 71 nm.

7.                  B-94 is a balloon used on a daily basis as an antenna for TV Martí.  It requires special preparations to the used exclusively as a radar station.

8.                  MiGs remained within Cuba’s ADIZ at all times, that time.

9.                  An immediate response by US interceptors took place.  Their departure time must have been very close to the MiGs’ takeoff, indicating other US intelligence sources present, besides radar (radio communications, satellite, etc.).  The time of initial US radar sightings: US interceptors 12:19 PM and MiGs 12:23 PM.

10.              No disclosure of this earlier US response in US Government press briefings on the events that took place the same day of the shootdown and in SEADS’ response to the Subcommittee’s question 14.  The ICAO investigation reports the US radar record of “Cuban military aircraft activity north of Havana between 12:15 and 12:45 hours” (the time corresponds with that shown in plate C207) and omits any response by the US.  See ICAO report sec. 1.1.6 and 2.3.1.2, attachments 3 and 2, respectively.

11.              The timing of this event corresponds to the expected arrival of BTTR to the area under its initial flight plan (never activated).  This initial flight plan was superseded by the one finally used that was activated for the fatal mission.  FAA sent both flight plans to Cuba.  (Please refer to “The Deadly Protocol”, attachment 4.)

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

 

RQ 10:    “Our policy for protecting US airspace remains unchanged.  Any unknown/nonflight plan aircraft entering the ADIZ will be intercepted, identified, and escorted or monitored as appropriate.”

 

RQ 27:    “NORAD/SEADS followed standard procedures on 24 February.  As discussed, NORAD does not routinely scramble aircraft in response to MiGs operating north of Cuba.  These procedures were not changed on 24 February for any reasons.”

 

BTTR’s comment

 

Apparently, SEADS followed procedures before the departure of BTTR’s flight and not when BTTR planes were in harm’s way.  (Issue V)

 

            SEADS’ other responses to the subcommittee’s questions that are contradicted by this incident

 

            11,       12,       20,       26,       33

VII.      SEADS claims that “at the time of the intercept, some BTTR aircraft were within 10 nm of Cuban sovereign airspace

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

 

RQ 3:    “The BTTR aircraft were operating inside the Cuban Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which extends to the 24th parallel.  In fact, at the time of the intercept, some BTTR aircraft were within 10 nm of Cuban sovereign airspace.  As such, BTTR aircraft were subject to intercept for identification, escort, or monitoring in accordance with accepted international procedures.  NORAD/SEADS uses these same ADIZ procedures north of the 24th latitude to identify unknown/nonflight plan aircraft entering the US ADIZ.”

 

            BTTR’s Comments

 

Either this comment “within 10 nm of Cuban sovereign airspace” is an honest mistake or it tries to imply that the BTTR aircraft were 2 miles off the Cuban shore.

 

The US claims that aircraft N2506 was momentarily 1.5 nm south of the line that delimits the 12 mile Cuban airspace.  The GPS on board N2506 showed that the aircraft was close but never entered the 12 mile limit.  (BTTR has given this testimony under oath in court).  The closest US radar that monitored the BTTR flight was about 90 miles away.  Therefore, the GPS on location has a smaller margin of error than the US radar.  The US has affirmed that the other two aircraft always remained north of the 12 mile limit.  BTTR has given this testimony under oath in court.

 

At the time that SEADS alleges that the intrusion by BTTR took place, the plane was in radio contact with Havana Center, which never challenged BTTR’s report of being 12 miles out.  The tapes of the communication between Havana Center and BTTR document this.

 

To state that “some BTTR aircraft were within 10 nm of Cuban sovereign space” is not only deceptive, it is malicious.

 

Also, as mentioned in Issue VIII, SEADS refers to a pattern of interceptions by the Cuban Migs.  BTTR affirms that Cuba has never conducted an interception of BTTR aircraft in accordance with ICAO guidelines (attachment 5). 

 

What happened on February 24, 1996 was not an interception.  It was cold, calculated murder of US citizens ambushed by terrorist Fidel Castro and others in international airspace.

 

Again, Cuba, as well as the US, were fully aware of the presence of BTTR planes in the area.  (Issue VIII).

 

VIII.     SEADS claims that (a) there was a well known pattern of interception of BTTR planes established by MiGs and (b) it is not unusual to see MiGs operating inside the Cuban ADIZ

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

(Emphasis added)

 

RQ 1.    “On several occasions prior to February 24, 1996 the SEADS personnel had witnessed Cuban MiGs intercepting BTTR aircraft in the Cuban internationally recognized ADIZ and perform legal non-hostile identification of aircraft flying towards their sovereign airspace.”

 

RQ 2:    “Cuba has established a precedent for flying north of the island without incident, and had previously intercepted BTTR aircraft in accordance with ICAO guidelines.”

 

RQ 13:    “Cuban MiGs often have intercepted BTTR aircraft in the past and employed internationally accepted interception procedures: they had established a well known precedent of intercepting BTTR aircraft without incident.”

 

RQ 20:    Events on February 24, 1996: “This (one of the MiGs was flying directly over the BTTR mission) is accepted air defense procedures if attempting to intercept, identify, and escort or monitor unknown aircraft entering a nation’s ADIZ…”

 

RQ 32:  “It is not unusual to see Cuban MiGs operating north of the island, outside the territorial limit, but inside the Cuban ADIZ.”

 

SEADS’ responses to subcommittee’s questions that repeat this issue:

 

            18,       26

 

BTTR comments and request for additional information

 

1.         Major Houlihan stated in sworn testimony, in answer to a question as to why he had made a radar screen print showing the three BTTR aircraft still heading southbound toward the Cuban ADIZ and the Cuban interceptor aircraft directly overhead all three of the BTTR aircraft that: “I had never seen Cuban MiGs out there flying before and to see this, it struck my attention.  I was worried about what was going on.  I had certainly never seen them come outside their ADIZ.  In fact, I’d flat never seen them out flying before.  They generally have a lot of problems providing fuel, from what I’ve been told, and I’ve never, in the two years we’ve been watching that area, seen them fly at all.”

 

Major Houlihan reiterated that in the two years that he had been watching the South Florida area he had never seen Cuban interceptors of any type in that area before.  He was not saying that it never had happened, but he had never seen any.

 

Reference: Major Houlihan’s testimony pages 372-373 and 554, attachment 12.

 

2.                  Since July 21, 1991 to date, including February 24, 1996, BTTR aircraft had followed a protocol, attachment 4, which requires the filing of an international flight plan for each aircraft crossing south of the 24th parallel. 

 

Each flight plan would require the FAA to assign a unique transponder code to identify each BTTR aircraft on any monitoring radar, including Cuba’s.  The FAA would routinely, including February 24, 1996, forward the flight plan to the Cuban authorities.  The protocol also requires that the BTTR aircraft make a radio call to Havana Center ten minutes prior to crossing southbound on the 24th parallel to indicate BTTR’s presence under an active US flight plan.  BTTR aircraft maintained radio contact with Cuba up to two minutes before the shootdown, at which time it confirmed its position of 12 miles north of Cuba, and was not challenged by Havana Center.

 

Therefore, Cuba was fully cognizant of the presence of BTTR aircraft in their ADIZ.  SEADS was also, or should have been, cognizant of these procedures.  Identification of these aircraft was unnecessary unless shootdown was intended.

 

3.         From the inception of BTTR to February 24, 1996, in about 1,800 missions, to the best recollection of BTTR pilots, they were aware of the presence of MiGs in the area where they were flying on seven occasions:

 

i.          Only on one occasion, on May 18, 1993, a MiG circled and flew side by side a BTTR plane and then flew away.  It did not perform any interception procedures in accordance with ICAO guidelines.  Videotape of news interview with BTTR pilots is available.  (See attachment 5, International Standards, Rules of the Air, Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Ninth Edition-July 1990, ICAO).

 

ii.                   On July 2l, 1991 BTTR pilots were warned and also protected by US interceptors.  Mary Ann Zduncyzk, then an FAA flight service supervisor at Tamiami Airport, recalls getting a teletype from the Cuban air force threatening “severe punishment” to the BTTR planes.  Ms. Zduncyzk stated: “We felt compelled to warn them”[iv]. 

 

On that same day, US interceptors protected BTTR aircraft while they assisted in the rescue of a raft of Cuban refugees.  (Attachment 6).

 

iii.         On December 19, 1992 the US warned BTTR of MiG activity, (see attachment 7.)

 

iv.         Two other occasions where BTTR sighted MiGs in the area.

 

v.         July 13, 1995, the date of the flotilla to commemorate the criminal sinking by Fidel Castro of the tugboat “13 de Marzo”.

 

vi.         February 24, 1996, when the MiGs did not, repeat, did not, perform interception procedures in accordance with ICAO guidelines.  Please refer to ICAO Report conclusions 3.18, 3.19, 3.20, and 3.22, attachment 8.

 

BTTR’s request for information and question

 

1.         BTTR asks SEADS to please provide detailed information, including dates, of all the interceptions by MiGs of BTTR aircraft, to which it has repeatedly referred to in this document, and which it has categorized as a “well known precedent of intercepting BTTR aircraft without incident.”

 

2.         What was SEADS’ interpretation of the fact that the MiGs did not follow interception procedures in accordance with ICAO guidelines on February 24, 1996?

 

3.         BTTR asks SEADS to provide a record of all the flights by MiGs mentioned in RQ 32, above.

IX.      SEADS claims that the interceptors at Homestead Air Force Base were taken down from battlestations alert from 3:20 PM to 3:35 PM, the period that included both shootdowns, due to a “communication mix-up”

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

 

RQ 33:    “…Owing to communication mix-up between Cheyenne Mountain and SEADS, Homestead was told to stand down from battle stations for 15 minutes, between 1520L and 1535L, the period that included both shoot downs.  CINCNORAD directed to Cheyenne Mountain that our alert aircraft should understand the Rules of Engagement and that we were not to be provocative.  This direction occurred before the CINC was briefed that the MiGs were airborne.  That direction was interpreted by NORAD duty officer that the fighters at Homestead should come off battle station, which was neither the direction or intent.  By the time the SEADS commander clarified the situation and placed the fighters back on battle stations, the engagement had already been terminated.

 

This command and control breakdown resulted in alert fighters on 5 minute airborne response time instead of 2-3 minute response time and did not impact the outcome to the day’s events.”

 

BTTR’s comments and questions:

 

SEADS’ response to question 33 indicates that this direction occurred before the CINC was briefed that the MiGs were airborne.  The MiGs were airborne at 3:00 PM and the battlestations alert was lifted on 3:20 PM.

 

Furthermore,

i.                     The US had been facing Castro and his terrorist regime 90 nm off its territory for the past 37 years.

ii.                   According to SEADS’ own testimony, Cuba had established a precedent for flying north of the island without incident (Issue VIII),

iii.                  When the US interceptors scrambled on Feb 24, 1996 before the BTTR flight, the MiGs retreated,

iv.                 US interceptors had been deployed according to standard operating procedures on Feb 24, 1996, before the departure of the BTTR flight, in reaction to Cuban MiGs flying within the Cuban ADIZ (Issue VI).

v.                   Then, why on February 24, 1996, at precisely the time of the shootdown, with the US radars and monitors on alert to follow the BTTR flight (Issue II), did all this confusion occur?

 

The engagement terminated at 3:53 PM, when the MiGs suspended the chase, not by 1535L, as indicated in SEADS’s response to question 33.

 

Regarding the “mix-up”:

 

What are the controls in place to prevent this type of “mix up”?

           

What are the names of the individuals involved in the “mix up”?

 

                        Are mix-ups of this type frequent?

 

If, as affirmed by SEADS, no one was aware of Cuba’s hostile intent until the time of the first shoot down, at 3:21 PM, what was the concern that “we were not to be provocative”, before 3:21 PM?  Again, why this concern when BTTR’s planes are in harm’s way and not earlier in the afternoon? (Issue VI)

 

            Did the lifting of the “battlestations alert” also preclude the scrambling of the interceptors?

           


X.        SEADS claims that on Feb 24, 1996 loss of life was not preventable and that Basulto was never threatened post shootdown

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

(Emphasis added)

 

RQ 4:    “Mr. Basulto was never threatened post shoot down, nor was US sovereign airspace”.

 

RQ 5: “ …On February 24th the evidence of a hostile act or hostile intent through intelligence sources did not occur until just prior to the second BTTR aircraft being shot down.  Due to the distance to the point where BTTR aircraft were attacked and the short time preceding the second shootdown, no US military resources were in a position to respond.  There was no threat to the surviving BTTR aircraft after the SEADS received knowledge of the two shoot downs.”

 

RQ 6:    “Without prior knowledge of hostile intent and without an assigned civilian force protection mission the military could not have prevented the shoot down of BTTR aircraft.”

 

RQ 8:    “At the point that SEADS determined a hostile act had occurred, the remaining BTTR aircraft had separated from danger...”

 

RQ 9:    “Again, by the time it was determined that a threat existed, the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the BTTR aircraft had passed.”

 

RQ 16:    “If the air Force had clear information that US lives were at risk, we would certainly make every effort to warn and protect our citizens.  On the day of the shoot down, there was no “unusual information” (i.e., an indication that US lives were in jeopardy) until the time of the first shoot down.  There was no unusual information to share”.

 

RQ 33:    Airborne time of an interceptor not on battlestations alert is 5 minutes.

 

RQ 34:    “In general, when US fighters have been scrambled, Cuban fighters have avoided confrontation with US fighters by moving away from the 24th parallel and closer to Cuba.  Since the Cuban fighters were not near the 24th parallel (they were never more than two minutes from their own territorial airspace) (BTTR’s note: please refer to Issue XI), it is difficult to speculate what their reaction would have been had we scrambled our fighters as soon a the MiGs approached the BTTR aircraft.  (BTTR’s note: please refer to Issues V and VI). 

 

Conservatively, it would have taken our fighters 20-25 minutes to reach the site of the first shoot down once the two entities came together on the radar scope.  Since that occurred at 1514, the earliest our F-15s could have been in visual range of the MiGs would be 15341539, or at least six minutes after the second shoot down.  All this is speculation, however, because our historical reference for MiG reaction is a knowledge that the Cubans were attempting to avoid confrontation.  In the case of the BTTR shootdown, it became clear for the first time after 1521 that they had hostile intent.  (BTTR’s note: please refer to Issue I.)  It is not logical to assume that they would have retreated.”

 

Background Information

 

The MiGs took off at 3:00 PM.  Major Houlihan’s “911” call to the Tyndall Air Force Base was at 3:16 PM.  Major Houlihan acknowledges that he completed this warning call five to six minutes before the first shoot down.

 

The first and second aircraft were downed at 3:21 PM and 3:28 PM, respectively.  Cuba called off the chase of Basulto’s aircraft at 3:53 PM. 

 

Major Houlihan states that at the time of his call, US interceptors at Homestead Air Force Base were on battlestations alert.  (See issue IX)

 

According to Major Houlihan’s sworn testimony, an interceptor on “battlestations” alert at Key West or at Homestead can reach the area of the shootdown within 5 minutes and in 10 minutes, respectively (airborne time: 2 minutes).  Not on battlestations alert airborne time: 8 minutes.

 

Reference:  Major Houlihan’s testimony, pages 470-471, attachment 12.

 

BTTR comments

 

BTTR claims that loss of life was preventable

 

BTTR maintains that the scrambling of US interceptors, without even reaching the area of the shootdown, may have deterred the MiGs and prevented the loss of life.  Cuba was also radar monitoring the events on February 24, 1996. 

 

This was confirmed by the incident before the departure of the BTTR flight on February 24, 1996, when US interceptors were scrambled and MiGs left, Issue VI, and by SEAD’s own response to question 34 (RQ 34, above).

 

According to US standard operating procedures, as described by Major Houlihan in sworn testimony, (Issue V), the scrambling of US interceptors was required at 3:16 PM when the MiGs crossed the “trigger line”.

 

 

 

 

If scrambled at 3:16 PM:

 

·        A US interceptor not on battlestations alert out of Key West, assuming airborne time of 5 minutes and flight time of less then 3 minutes, would have reached the area of the shootdown about 3:24 PM.

·        A US interceptor on battlestations alert out of Homestead would have reached the area at about 3:26 PM.

 

Both before the shootdown of the second aircraft.

 

We repeat: we believe that the mere scrambling of the interceptors, without reaching the area of the shootdown, would have served at a deterrent.

 

We are at a loss about SEADS’ assertion in response to question 34 that it would have taken a fighter 20 to 25 minutes to reach the site of the first shootdown, on which it bases the apparently very precise calculation for arriving at the site of the second shootdown (15341539).  BTTR asks SEADS to explain this calculation. 

 

According to Major Houlihan’s testimony, assuming an interceptor at Homestead was not on battlestations alert and an airborne time of 8 minutes (SEADS claims airborne time is 5 minutes), it would have taken about 16 minutes.

 

Regarding SEADS’ “speculation” in its response to question 34 that Cuba had hostile intent and that it is not logical to assume that they would have retreated, BTTR “speculates” that the hostile intent was against the BTTR slow moving, unarmed, small US flag civilian aircraft and not against US fighters.  (Please refer to Issue VI).

 

BTTR claims that Basulto was threatened post shoot down

 

SEADS’ conclusion that after the shootdown the remaining aircraft had separated from danger and that the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the BTTR aircraft had passed is not founded on reason.

 

At 3:21 PM, the time of the first shootdown, the position of Basulto’s aircraft was 87 nm from Key West (J07 radar site), or 44 minutes flight time away, definitely in “harm’s way”.  The MiGs were, according to SEADS’ responses to questions 4 and 19, 23 miles north of Cuba, or 67 miles from Key West, the equivalent of 7 minutes flight time. 

 

According to customs radar plate, at 11531 EST (3:31 PM EST) a MiG is less than 16 nm away from Basulto’s plane (less than 2 minutes flight time).

 

Given the speed of MiGs, the relative speed of the MiGs to the speed of Basulto’s plane (about 2 m/minute), and the area within which all the events took place, to say that “Mr. Basulto was never threatened post shoot down” is an insult to the reader’s intelligence.  A MiG can move at 10 nm a minute.  This scenario took place in a 90nm distance.

 

SEADS’ answer to question 4 mentions that the second pair of MiGs came no closer than 48.1 nm to Mr. Basulto.  In flight time, that is 5 minutes.  Furthermore, Basulto’s aircraft was chased by MiGs until 3:53 PM, when they suspended the mission.  (Please refer to issue XI.)

XI.       SEADS claims that the MiGs never crossed the 24th parallel, never threatened US sovereign airspace, and never gave chase to Basulto’s plane

 

SEADS’ responses to subcommittee’s questions that repeat this issue:

 

            3,         4,         8,         11,       18,       19,       20,       27,       33,       34

 

BTTR’s remarks

 

Radar sites B94 and J07 place the location of Basulto’s plane at 3:53 PM (at the time the MiGs suspended the chase) at 24º 26’ N 082º 27’W and 24º 25’N 082º 27’W, respectively, about 26 miles North above the 24th parallel, attachment 9.

 

The transcripts of the recorded verbal communications (transcripts) of the MiGs that chased Basulto’s plane with their controllers (attachment 10) evidence that the MiGs reported three visual detailed identifications of the aircraft, at 3:45 PM, 3:47 PM, and 3:53 PM.  The MiGs had made similar identifications of the two aircraft that had been previously shot down.  In order to be able to make such identifications, the MiGs must have been about one mile from the plane.

 

The MiG pilots actively interchanged information with their controllers clearly intended to shoot down Basulto’s plane.  The transcripts indicate that at some points the MiGs missed the target and passed Basulto’s plane.

 

The cross-referencing of the US Air Force radar print screens and location data to the MiGs’ transcripts at the time the chase was called off places the MiGs at about 26 miles North of the 24th parallel, and about three minutes (flight time) from the US shore.

 

Contrary to SEADS’ assertions, this posed a very real threat to the US sovereign airspace and to the US citizens onboard Basulto’s plane.

 

The US and Cuba now maintain that the MiGs never crossed the 24th parallel.  The US claims that the MiGs did not give chase to Basulto’s plane.

 

According to the ICAO Report, item 1.1.47 and related radar plate, ICAO Report, page 73 (attachment 11): “…United States radar sources indicated that this search was in the area 23º 35N 082º 58 W, and did not show any radar contact in that area other than the Cuban interceptors.  At the time of this search, N2506 (Basulto’s plane) was tracking well to the north and was at 15:46 hours, according to both the Cuban and the United States radar records, some 40 NM northwest of the Cuban interceptors.”  (MiG flight time 4 minutes).  Again, in the ICAO Report, the United States has stated that there were no small civilian aircraft in the area other than the BTTR aircraft.

 

 

Therefore, the Cuban/US assumption must be that the MiGs chased a “phantom” aircraft, perfectly fitting the description of Basulto’s plane, invisible to US radars.

 

The US has refused to show BTTR the raw radar data.  It has only provided computer depictions.

 

The conversations between the MiGs and ground control were monitored by an undisclosed US source.  The US provided the above mentioned radar/location information and transcripts at the FAA vs. José Basulto court hearings on June 27, 1996, before the United States National Transportation Safety Board.  (Basulto appealed to recover his pilot license that had been revoked by the FAA.)  The US government has refused to release these tapes to BTTR.  At the insistence of the Judge who presided at the hearing, the government allowed BTTR access to two of four tracks (sound and time) and provided the US prepared transcripts.

 

SEADS’ response to question 4 indicates that the MiGs “came no closer than 60.9 to Key West and were never a threat to the air sovereignty of the US nor were they a threat to the fleeing BTTR aircraft.”  According to SEADS own assertion, the MiGs came to within 6 minutes flight time from Key West.

 

 

XII.      SEADS claims that there was no need to contact BTTR during the 53 minute documented chase by the MiGs of the BTTR aircraft on Feb 24, 1996

 

SEADS’ responses to the subcommittee’s questions (RQ):

(Emphasis added)

 

RQ 15.    To the question that if it is customary to provide information that might be considered unusual with the BTTR concerning their flight, the answer was:  “No.  The BTTR flights are conducted under the purview of the FAA and ICAO agreements.  NORAD/SEADS would normally have no dialogue with BTTR.”

 

RQ 16:    “If the Air Force had clear information that US lives were at risk, we would certainly make every effort to warn and protect our citizens.  On the day of the shoot down, there was no “unusual information” (i.e., an indication that US lives were in jeopardy) until the time of the first shoot down.  There was no unusual information to share.”

 

BTTR’s comments

 

It is inconceivable that no US agency contacted BTTR during the 53 minute chase, including the 32 minutes after the shootdown of the first aircraft.

 

The US Department of State listed Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, the same classification as Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria; the US had prior knowledge that Castro was planning the shootdown (Issue I and attachment 1); Major Houlihan made the “911” call (Issue I); US government radars and monitors were on alert (Issue II); there was Mig and US interceptor activity in their respective ADIZs about three hours before the shootdown, (Issue VI); two planes were shot down and Basulto’s plane was chased by MiGs to about three minutes flight time from the US shore, and,

 

according to SEADS, there was no unusual information to share.

 

According to Major Houlihan’s testimony, such a phone call would take from 1 to 1 ½ minutes to make.  Reference:  Page 430, attachment 12.

 

On February 24, 1996 BTTR planes maintained radio communication with their base.  US agencies could have either called the planes via radio or the base via phone.

XIII.     SEADS did not provide answers to questions:

 

15,       23,       24,       25,       28,       29,       30,       35,       36

 

Footnotes:

 

i.    Major Jeffrey Houlihan was at the time of this testimony US Customs Service, Senior Detection Systems Specialist at March Air Force Base, California.  His duty was to oversee all radar controllers monitoring the Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Southwest border with Mexico.  Previously he had been an air weapons controller with the US Air Force.  He had worked for the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) at the 26th Air Division at March Air force Base.  He had been assigned to weapons sections and had used fighter aircraft to perform intercepts on unknown aircrafts coming into the United States.  Major Houlihan was familiar with and had attended school at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida.  He was first assigned to radar control duties in January of 1982.

 

ii.    Major Houlihan’s sworn testimony referred to in this document was given at the FAA vs. José Basulto court hearings on June 27, 1996, before the United States National Transportation Safety Board, where Basulto appealed to recover his pilot license which had been revoked by the FAA.

 

iii.    ICAO Report refers to the Report of the Investigation Regarding the Shooting Down of Two US Registered Private Civil Aircraft by Cuban Military Aircraft on 24 February 1996, dated June 1996.