The Downing of
Brothers to the Rescue Aircraft on February 24, 1996
Summary of
Unanswered Questions
Negotiations between the Cuban and United
States’ governments to establish relations were underway as of February 24,
1996. J. Sheehan, General, U.S. Marine
Corps and Commander in Chief-U.S. Atlantic Command, (at the time of the
shootdown), has lobbied to lift the embargo, before and after February 24,
1996, while on active duty and after retirement (1).
Statements
of Facts and Questions
1. The
Clinton administration remained silent in connection with a “calculated
warning” by the Cuban government.
Castro had discussed BTTR flights with U.S. officials (2). Specifically, three weeks before the shootdown of February 24, 1996, Cuban air force Gen. Arnaldo Tamayo asked U.S. Navy admiral Eugene Carroll (who was in Havana as part of an American delegation to meet with leaders of the Cuban military) what he thought would be the United States’ reaction if the Cuban air force shot down the BTTR airplanes. The admiral referred the question to the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The United States never responded to what Admiral Carroll has referred to as a calculated warning (3).
Questions
(Q)
Why didn’t the Clinton
administration respond to Castro’s warning?
Why didn’t the Clinton administration warn BTTR (4)?
2. The
Clinton administration had prior knowledge that Castro was planning an attack
on Brothers to the Rescue airplanes, yet, it never informed BTTR.
For political reasons, the Clinton administration is now trying to deport or “burn” a previously acquitted witness who can testify to the premeditation of this crime.
SOF: In January 1996 U.S. intelligence agencies spotted Cuban MiGs
test-firing air-to-air missiles and practice maneuvers to attack slow-moving
aircraft similar to BTTR planes (5).
A witness to these maneuvers, Adel Regalado
Ulloa, who fled to the United States in August of 1996, previously acquitted of
sky-jacking, will be brought to trial again as a result of a political decision
made by the Immigration Department.
Q: Why wasn’t Brothers to the Rescue advised of the practice
maneuvers?
Background Information: Chronology of events related to the murder
Radar
sighting of MiGs take off.
“Battlestations” alert placed at
Homestead
base shortly thereafter 3:00
PM
“911”
call from Major Jeffrey Houlihan (6.a) (7) 3:16 PM
First
aircraft is shot down 3:21
PM
Second
aircraft is shot down 3:28
PM
Third
BTTR aircraft crosses 24th parallel, Northbound 3:41
PM
MiGs
make visual contact with the third BTTR aircraft 3:45 PM
MiGs
positively identify the third BTTR aircraft as a light
blue
Cessna 337 (8) 3:47
PM
Third
BTTR aircraft at 24:16’:18”, about 16 miles North of the
24th
parallel (9) 3:49
PM
Third
BTTR aircraft at 24-26’ North and 082-27” West. About 26
miles
North above the 24th Parallel in U.S. controlled airspace. The
MiGs
make visual contact for the third time.
MiGs are ordered to
suspend
the mission. At this point the Cuban
MiG was three
minutes
from U.S. shore (10) 3:53
PM
Background Information:
Reaction Time of US Interceptors
The reaction time for an interceptor
from Key West to reach the area is, if on “battlestations” alert: less than 5
minutes and, not on “battlestations” alert: less than 11 minutes (6.a).
3. The“miscommunication
error” that cancelled the “battlestations” alert at Homestead has never been
explained
SOF: The “battlestations” alert placed at the Homestead base was
cancelled. According to a Report of
Inquiry prepared by Rodney P. Kelly, Brigadier General, USAF, the decision to
take the Homestead aircraft off battlestations alert was due to a
“miscommunication error” (which has never been explained). According to Brigadier General Kelly, this
“miscommunication error” did not affect the outcome of the event. General Kelly also stated that: “No evidence
suggests that any US element had prior knowledge of hostile intent on the part
of the Cuban forces.” He also indicates
that “Due to speed of events and location of the shoot down, US aircraft could
not have responded to the incident in time to prevent loss of life”(11).
Q: What was the nature of this “miscommunication error”?
According to the above information on the chronology of the shootdown and the reaction time of the interceptors, the shootdown of the second aircraft might have been prevented. As a matter of fact, we are convinced that the take off of US interceptors by itself would have provided an immediate deterrent to Castro’s action, since Cuba was also radar monitoring the event.
4. Response
to a “911” call: “...we’re handling it, don’t worry” (6.a) (7)
SOF: According to sworn testimony in US Federal Court by US Customs
Official Jeffrey Houlihan, his “911” call to the Tyndall Air Force Base in
Florida included the following exchange:
“What I told him was ‘do you see the Brothers to the Rescue
aircraft?’ The
Senior
Director Technician replied ‘yes’, that he did. I said ‘do you know what’s going on with them today’ and he said
‘yes, we’ve been briefed’. And then
said ‘do you see that primary aircraft, 500 knot primary’ and he said ‘yes, we
see it’. I said ‘well, it looks like a
MIG-23 to me heading directly towards the United States. I think that’s important’. And he responded ‘yes, we’re handling it,
don’t worry’.”
Q: What did all this mean?
Was the “battlestations” alert lifted before or after this call?
Please refer to a letter by Howard
G. DeWolf, Brigadier General, USAF, Director, Inter-American Region, dated
September 5, 1996, to Congressman Dan Burton which indicates that “Department
of Defense radars do not routinely and systematically track civilian U.S.
aircraft operating in international airspace.
Our air defense personnel were informed by a Customs radar operator of
the MiGs closing on slower aircraft and replied that they had the aircraft on
their radars. However, neither party
knew that the two slow-moving aircraft were the BTTR aircraft nor were they
aware of the Cuban Government’s intentions”.
Please also refer to Mr. Basulto’s letter of September 13, 1996 to Mr.
Gil Kapen regarding the aforementioned letter from Brigadier General DeWolf for
other inaccuracies and contradictions in said letter (12).
Also, please refer to a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense signed
by Howell M. Estes III, General USAF, Commander in Chief, dated October 13,
1996, forwarding the Report of Inquiry prepared by Rodney P. Kelly, Brigadier
General, USAF (11), which indicates that NORAD, the FAA, CARIBROC and Customs
were all tracking BTTR activity on February 24, 1996, and Mr. Basulto’s
response to this document dated February 19, 1997 which highlights certain
inaccuracies and contradictions in this memorandum (13). Also note that US radars had been placed on
alert several days before February 24, 1996 to follow BTTR’s flights (ICAO
report).
5. U.S.
interceptors were not deployed to deter MiGs in international waters, in
contravention of standard operating procedure related to the “trigger
line”. Also, please refer to Item 7,
below.
SOF: According to sworn testimony in US Federal Court by US Customs
Official Jeffrey Houlihan, it is standard operating procedure to deploy
interceptors once Cuban MiGs cross the Cuban 12 mile territorial limit-the
“trigger line” (6.b). Also, he
indicated that the presence of MiGs in the area was uncommon (6.c).
Interceptors had been deployed on
the morning of February 24, 1996 to deter Cuban MiGs in the area, hours before
the BTTR aircraft took off in the afternoon.
Q: Why weren’t U.S. Air Force interceptors deployed to deter the
MiGs in international airspace? Why
weren’t Standard Operating Procedures followed?
6.SOF: BTTR was never informed of the radar
sightings of the MiGs on February 24, 1996 (4). Similar calls had been made on numerous occasions in the past
(6.d), and each call had taken less than 2 minutes. Previously, when advised of Cuban MiGs, BTTR airplanes had
returned to their base.
Q: Why wasn’t a simple
call made during the period from 3:00 PM to 3:53 PM?
Fifty three minutes of silence. Fifty three minutes during which Cuban MiGs hunted two BTTR planes, murdered their four occupants in international airspace, and chased the third plane to within three minutes of the United States. Why?
Was there any attempt by the Clinton
administration to contact the Cuban authorities during these events?
And why now, a little over two years after the murder,
the FAA instructs BTTR pilots to follow orders given by Castro’s MiGs? Please note that this issue is being addressed by
BTTR separately.
And why now, a little over two years
after the murder, without any changes on the part of Castro’s government, is
the Clinton administration lifting the sanctions it reluctantly imposed on
Castro after the crime? Why were the
key sanctions never even implemented?
(This subject is beyond the scope of this document.)
7. There
is evidence that substantiates that at least one of the MiGs in pursuit of the
third aircraft did cross the 24th parallel.
SOF: In the ICAO report, the United States has stated that there were
no other small civilian aircraft in the area other than the BTTR aircraft and
the Cuban interceptor MiGs. In the
transcript between the MiGs and the Cuban controllers, the MiGs positively
identified the third BTTR aircraft three times, just as it had done with the
other two aircraft, prior to shooting them down. Yet, it is interesting to
note that in paragraph 1.1.47 of the ICAO report, the U.S. accuses Cuba of
chasing a non-existing (non-existing because the U.S. agrees that there were no
other aircraft in the vicinity) light blue and white Cessna # 337 and Cuba
agrees that the Cessna it was chasing was not the third BTTR aircraft. This bizarre explanation adopted by both the
United States and Cuba appears to be a convenient position for both parties to
take, to cover up the fact that the Cuban MiGs crossed the 24th parallel (14).
In
conclusion, when the U.S. Air Force
radar print screens and location data are cross referenced with the transcripts
of the Cuban MiGs with their controllers, both documents concur that the third
BTTR aircraft was well to the North of the 24th parallel and that the Cuban
MiGs were within 3 minutes of reaching the United States.
The recorded communications of the
two MiGs in pursuit of the third BTTR aircraft indicate a sighting of a Cessna
337 light blue or light blue and white at 3:47 and at 3:53 PM, respectively
(15). At that time U.S. radar (on alert
that day) places the third aircraft 26 nautical miles North of parallel 24
(16).
Also, please refer to item 6 of the Testimony of José Basulto before
the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on September 18, 1996, specifically
items 6 d and e which state: “...Resist
the Judge’s petition to produce in court the recordings of the radio
communications of the MiGs pilots and their controllers, already heard by ICAO
investigators, and partially released to the United Nations. When finally obtained, these recordings
provided BTTR with evidence that the MiGs pursued the last remaining BTTR
aircraft above the 24th parallel and to within three minutes of the U.S. When we were finally allowed to hear the
tapes, we were given access to only two of the four tracks of the tapes” (17).
Q: Where, other than at the same location of the third aircraft,
could the MiGs be, if, according to U.S. sources, there was no other aircraft in
the area?
8.SOF: The US Air Force does not allow BTTR to
review the raw radar data held by it; it has only shown a computer depiction of
the events.
Q: Why?
9.SOF: A meeting between U.S. and Cuban military
officials regarding the shootdown was held on March 2, 1996 in New York (18).
Q: What was the nature of this meeting?
10.SOF Phase I of the report on the shootdown of
Brothers to the Rescue aircraft issued in April of 1997 by the Department of
Defense Inspector General was classified “Top Secret”. We understand that Phase II of this report
was recently completed, is also classified top secret, and could be made
available to Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen.
Q: What procedures can BTTR undertake to gain access to this
report?
11.Q: What
“information” did Juan Pablo Roque give the FBI on BTTR’s intentions for
February 24, 1996 and what actions were taken based on this information (4)
(18)?
12.
For
certain answers regarding how the survival of one plane foiled Castro’s plot please
refer to article on this subject (19).
The Downing of Brothers to
the Rescue Aircraft on February 24, 1996
Summary of Unanswered
Questions
Prepared by Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR)
References
are to the Dossier Index.
(1) Letter of October 15, 1995 by General J.J.
Sheehan, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, to
Senator Sam Nunn, Senate, Committee on Armed Services
Diario
de las Américas, March 14, 1998, “Está en Cuba ex-jefe de la OTAN” (Former
Chief of NATO (General J. Sheehan) is in Cuba)
(2) Section III. The New Yorker, January, 1998, “Backfire”
(3) Attachment 1. CNN transcript of news show 9:25 am ET Feb. 25, 1996
(4) Section III. The Miami Herald’s Tropic Magazine, Feb. 16, 1997, “Brothers
Unrescued”
(5) Attachment 1. Time Magazine, Oct. 28, 1996, “Clinton’s Cuban Road to Florida”
(6) Attachment 12. Transcripts of sworn court testimony by Major Jeffrey
Houlihan. Major Houlihan was at the
time of this testimony U.S. Customs Service, Senior Detection Systems
Specialist at March Air Force Base, California. Formerly he had been with the Air Force. First assigned to radar control duties in
January of 1982.
(6.a) Pages 469-471
(6.b) Pages 482-484
(6.c) Pages 372 and 553-554
(6.d) Pages 429-430
(7) The Miami Herald, July 3, 1996, “U.S. Radar
Official: 911 call”
(8) Attachment 10. Exhibit G-2, pg. 10, 11 and 12.
(9) Attachment 9. U.S. Air Force screen prints.
(10) Attachment 10. MiG’s Communications transcript. Exhibit G-2, pg. 13 for event time
and U.S. radar data from radar site B94, for location.
(11) Attachment 15. Report of Inquiry prepared by Brigadier General Rodney P. Kelly
(12) Attachment 15
(13) Attachment 15
(14) Attachment 11. ICAO Report pg. 13, par. I.1.47, Tab 1
(15)
Attachment 10. Exhibit G-2, pg 12
(16)
Attachment 9. Site J07, pg. 4, and Site B94, pg. 8
(17) Testimony of José Basulto, President of
Brothers to the Rescue before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. September 18, 1996.
(18) Attachment 1. Interviews by CNN with Juan Pablo Roque on Feb. 27, 1996 in
Havana and “FBI admits paying Cuban to spy, inform on exiles”, Sun Sentinel,
February 29,1996.
(19) Section III. The Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1996, “The Plane that Foiled
Castro’s Plot”
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
DEC
28, 1998
Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0921
Dear Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen:
This is in response to an August 31, 1998, letter to the Attorney General of
the United States, signed jointly by you and Congressman Lincoln Diaz-Balart,
requesting answers to several questions posed by Mr. Jose Basulto regarding the
shootdown of two Brothers to the Rescue aircraft by the Cuban military. The
Department of Justice forwarded a copy of your letter to this office for
additional response because many of Mr. Basulto's questions (all but questions
9, 11, and 12) refer to the actions of the Department of Defense (DoD) elements
in connection with the shootdown incident.
This office has conducted an
exhaustive review of the shootdown incident and has issued two reports: Report
Number PO 97-011, "The DoD Response to the Brothers to the Rescue Incident
- Phase I," March 28, 1997; and Report Number IR 98-609, "The DoD
Response to the Brothers to the Rescue Incident - Phase II," August 10,
1998. Copies of both reports were delivered to the chairman and ranking
minority members of multiple committees of the U.S. House of Representatives
and the U.S. Senate. In addition, on September 14, 1998, members of my staff
met with both Ms. Yleen Poblete, of your subcommittee staff, and Mr. Mike
Delph, Professional Staff, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
chaired by Congressman Dan Burton, to discuss Phase II report and questions
raised by Mr. Basulto.
The two reports address all of
the DoD-related issues raised by Mr. Basulto's question. The two reports,
classified Secret and containing Sensitive Compartmented Information, are
available to you or to an appropriately cleared member of your staff by
contacting the security officer of one of the congressional committees. We do
not have unclassified versions of the reports which could be shared with Mr.
Basulto. Additionally, we note that national security classifications prohibit
us from providing detailed responses to many of the questions raised by Mr.
Basulto.
We trust that this information is
helpful and we regret that we are unable to provide a more comprehensive
response to the complicated and sensitive questions raised by Mr. Basulto.
A similar letter has been provided to Congressman Diaz-Balart. If we may be of
further assistance, please contact me or Mr. John R. Crane, Office of
Congressional Liaison, at (703) 604-8324.
Sincerely,
Eleanor Hill
Inspector General